Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

National Parks and Conservation Association v.
Board of State Lands and Patrick D. Spurgin,
Division of State Lands and Forestry, State of Utah :
Response to Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Fred G. Nelson; David S. Christensen; Patrick B. Nolan; Attorneys
for Intervenor.
Chris Wangsgard; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; William J. Lockhart; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands and Patrick D. Spurgin, Division of State Lands and
Forestry, State of Utah, No. 880022.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1860

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

45.9
'.S9
DOCKET MO.

li<m$~
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL PARKS AND
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION,

Case No. 880022

Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF STATE LANDS and
PATRICK D. SPURGIN, AS
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY,
STATE OF UTAH
Respondents, and
GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH
Intervenor

GARFIELD COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONS FOR REHEARING

JAN GRAHAM, Attorney General
FRED G. NELSON, STEVE ALDER
Assistant Attorneys General
ATTORNEY GENERALS' OFFICE
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
William J. Lockhart
P.O. Box 8672
Salt Lake City, UT 84158
WAYNE G. PETTY
Moyle & Draper, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1915
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

WALLACE A. LEE/#5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
(801) 676-2290
BARBARA G. HJELLE/#4597
Special Counsel to
Garfield County
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
(801) 628-7777
ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR
GARFIELD COUNTY

FILED
OCT 2 1 1993
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL PARKS AND
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION,

Case No. 880022

Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF STATE LANDS and
PATRICK D. SPURGIN, AS
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY,
STATE OF UTAH
Respondents, and
GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH
Intervenor

GARFIELD COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONS FOR REHEARING

JAN GRAHAM, Attorney General
FRED G. NELSON, STEVE ALDER
Assistant Attorneys General
ATTORNEY GENERALS' OFFICE
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
William J. Lockhart
P.O. BOX 8672
Salt Lake City, UT 84158
WAYNE G. PETTY
Moyle & Draper, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1915
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

WALLACE A. LEE/#5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
(801) 676-2290
BARBARA G. HJELLE/#4597
Special Counsel to
Garfield County
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
(801) 628-7777
ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR
GARFIELD COUNTY

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORANDUM OF POINT8 AND AUTHORITIES . . .
I. FACTS
II. DISCUSSION
A.
THE NEW APPRAISALS MUST BE COMPLETE IN ORDER
TO ALLOW AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS FOR ANY
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER BY THIS
COURT.
1.
Reconsideration without the information
to be provided by the independent
appraisals would be premature.
2.
The arguments in favor of rehearing now
are clearly based upon conjectural
matters which cannot adequately support a
further ruling by this Court.
B.
FEDERAL ACTIONS TAKEN IN 1993 ARE IRRELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES OF THIS CASE.
1.
The federal-state land exchange is not
relevant to this matter.
2.
This court does not have jurisdiction to
decide the application of the recent
federal legislation to section 16 and
should not allow injection of such an
issue into this case.
C.
THE LAW OF TRUSTS, AS WELL AS THE EXISTING
OPINION OF THIS COURT. MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE
DEED IS NOT VOID.
D.
THE ISSUE OF THE STATE'S DUTY WITH REGARD TO
SCHOOL TRUST LANDS IN RELATION TO "NONECONOMIC" VALUES HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY ADDRESSED
IN THE COURT'S EXISTING OPINION AND SHOULD NOT
BE REVISITED.
III. CONCLUSION

1
1
1

2
2

5
8
8

9
10

13
13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Allard v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 663 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983) . . . . 3
Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F.Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala.
1968)
3
Boyd v. Smith, 96 A. 526 (Md. 1916)

4

Hatcher v. United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 643 P.2d 359 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982)
3
Kramme v. Mewshaw, 147 Md. at 548, 550-551, 128 A. at 473, 474
1.

4

Murphy v. Central Bank & Trust, 699 P. 2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985)
3
National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State
Lands, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1993)
2, 9-12
Webb & Knapp, Inc. v. Hanover Bank, 133 A.2d 450 (Md. 1957) . . 4
Other Authorities Cited
90 C.J.S. Trusts § 297 (1955)

4, 10

Brief of Intervenor, Garfield County, at pp. 16-18

ii.

12

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Garfield County, by and through counsel, hereby responds to
the petitions of National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA)
and the State of Utah for rehearing in this matter.
I.
1.

Garfield

County

PACTS

selected

an

appraiser

based

on

requirements imposed by the Division of State Lands and Forestry.
See, affidavit of Thomas V. Hatch, attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference as Exhibit A.

Furthermore, the appraiser

was selected from names provided by and upon the recommendation of
the Division.
2.

Id.

Garfield

County

has

had

no

prior

or

subsequent

association with the appraiser and had no contact with him other
than to provide the information requested in the course of the
appraisal.
3.

Id.

The property added to the exchange by Garfield County was

purchased by the County specifically for the purpose of exchange
with the state, because the state had indicated its interest in
obtaining that specific parcel.
4.

There

is

no

Id.

evidence

in

the

record

of

any

misrepresentation or fraud in the appraisal process or in the
exchange process as a whole.
5.

The federal-state land exchange legislation has been

signed by President Clinton. A copy of the legislation is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit B.

1

II.

DISCUSSION

Garfield County opposes rehearing

at this time because,

without the facts pertaining to the new appraisal, there is not an
adequate basis for any ruling on the issues raised; the law of
trusts, as well as the opinion of this Court, do not support a
holding that the deed is void or voidable; the federal-state land
exchange, which has been signed into law, is irrelevant to the
issues of this case; and this Court's opinion on the trustee's duty
with regard to "noneconomic" values does not require further
consideration.
A.

THE NEW APPRAISALS MUST BE COMPLETE IN ORDER
TO ALLOW AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS FOR ANY
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER BY THIS
COURT,
1.

Reconsideration without the information
to be provided bv the independent
appraisals would be premature.

The fundamental reason that this Court remanded this matter
back to the Division of State lands was for the purpose of
determining "whether the appraised values of section 16 and the
Garfield County lands offered in exchange represent the full value
of those lands."

National Parks and Conservation Association v.

Board of State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1993) . The basis for
this Court's decision was the fact that the appraisal was submitted
by Garfield County rather than by an appraiser hired by the
Division. As a result of the procedure used by the Division, which
this Court found to be inadequate, a new appraisal has been
ordered.
There

is

no

evidence,

however,
2

that

there

was

any

misrepresentation, fraud or bad faith in the procedures adopted by
the Division. On the contrary, the Division's procedure was based
solely on its understanding of its duty as trustee, one that has
now been corrected by this Court.
established in good faith.

That understanding was clearly

The record makes it clear that the

Division was attempting to carry out faithfully its duty as trustee
to obtain greater than equal value for the lands being exchanged
and that the Division undertook substantial procedural efforts to
achieve that goal.
The evidence also shows that Garfield County did not shop for
a favorable appraisal, but rather chose an appraiser based solely
on the requirements of and the recommendation of the Division. The
County had no prior relationship with the appraiser and did not
engage in any actions which might have inappropriately influenced
the appraiser's results.

Clearly, Garfield County was acting in

good faith in this transaction.
There is ample evidence to suggest that the new appraisal to
be obtained by the Division would be substantially similar to the
one

obtained

by

the County,

because

of the

absence

of any

"shopping" or "sharp dealing" by the County.
Until the new appraisal comes in, there is no basis to
conclude, one way or another, that the value obtained for the
property was in any way inadequate, which is the fundamental
concern expressed by the Court and the applicable case law.
In the cases cited by this Court in its opinion addressed to
the trustee's duty to obtain an independent appraisal, the sales in
3

question were not voided*

See, Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Natfl

Bank, 348 F.Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Murohv v. Central Bank &
Trust, 699 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Hatcher v. United States
N a f l Bank of Or. . 643 P.2d 359 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Allard v.
Pacific Nat'l Bank. 663 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983).
In Webb & Knapp, Inc. v. Hanover Bank, 133 A.2d 450 (Md.
1957), the sale in question required court ratification.

In other

words, that sale had not yet been consummated, since a sale which
requires court approval amounts only to an offer to purchase.
C.J.S. Trusts § 297 (1955).

90

The Webb & Knapp case, however,

recites the fundamental principles applicable here:
If a sale should be made by a conventional
trustee in good faith and according to his
best judgment, the sale will not be set aside
unless there exists an inadequacy of price
that, under the circumstances, is directly
attributable to some failure of reasonable
diligence or effort in the making of the sale.
. . . [B]oth an inadequacy of price and a
justifiable expectation of securing a higher
price must co-exist before a court will set
aside a contract of private sale made in good
faith by a conventional trustee in the
exercise of a discretion which was incident to
an express power of sale.
133 A.2d at 456-457, quoting Kramme v. Mewshaw. 147 Md. at 548,
550-551, 128 A. at 473, 474.
" [M]ere inadequacy of price, standing alone, is not sufficient
to vacate a sale, unless it be so gross and inordinate as to
indicate some mistake or unfairness in the sale for which the
purchaser is responsible, or misconduct or fraud on the part of the
trustee making the sale.11

Bovd v. Smith, 96 A. 526 (Md, 1916).

Clearly, in the absence of the results of the new appraisal,

there is insufficient factual basis for any decision by this Court
concerning the status of the transaction, since one of the salient
facts is whether the price obtained was inadequate.

Furthermore,

in order to invalidate the sale, the Court would also have to
conclude that the state went beyond mere error in its understanding
of its obligations as trustee and, in fact, acted in bad faith.
Furthermore, there may be new issues which arise in the course
of the second appraisal, which are now unpredictable, but which
might later require the attention of this Court. The interests of
judicial economy support a decision to postpone consideration of
the status of the transaction until all of the facts of the new
appraisal have been obtained, if at all.

This Court's lengthy

consideration of the issues on appeal should not be reconsidered in
a piecemeal fashion.
2.

The arguments in favor of rehearing now
are clearly based upon conjectural
matters which cannot adequately support a
further ruling by this Court.

In addition to the conjectural nature of what the outcome of
the new appraisal might be, NPCA offers several other conjectural
bases for rehearing, all insufficient to justify a further delay in
the remand proceedings pending rehearing.
NPCA assumes that the appraisal will come in showing a higher
value for section 16 in comparison to the airport and industrial
park property which was exchanged for it.

Assuming that is true,

however, there must be further conjecture regarding the decisions
which might result from that new information. Assuming, arguendo,
that the value of section 16 is sxibstantially higher in comparison
5

to the property exchanged, we do not know what the parties would
do.

It is possible that negotiations arising based upon the new

information would lead to an exchange back from the County to the
state.

In that case, the issues pertaining to the validity of the

deed would be moot.
NPCA suggests that the Division could allow the County a
preference "among equally advantageous offers."

That proposal,

alone, clearly reflects the inherent reasons why rehearing should
not

be

had.

Consideration

There
of

such

are

no

other

an

issue

would

offers
be

at

based

this

time.1

entirely

on

speculation as to what the relevant factors might be at the time
the

Division

obtains

the

new

appraisal.

While

granting

a

preference to Garfield County has merit, given the facts of this
matter, there is no reason to address that possibility

in a

rehearing.
NPCA's proposal that the County be given a preference as
against other offers is subject to a more serious weakness in the
context of this case.

Current or future offers, six years after

the exchange, are not relevant to what might have been available at
the time the exchange took place between the County and the
Division.

It is the fair market value at the time of the exchange

and the conditions which were known to the trustee at that time
1

Under the federal legislation, there must be appraisals and,
if the parties are not satisfied, there may be lengthy court
proceedings to determine fair value. See, Exhibit B. Under the
circumstances, the possibility of considering the federal-state
exchange as another "offer" to compare to Garfield Countyfs offer
is highly speculative. NPCA notes the speculative nature of this
argument at page 7 of its petition for rehearing.
6

which are the relevant considerations in addressing the trustee's
duty.

See, e.g. . 643 P.2d at 366.

This case must focus on the

duties of the trustee under the circumstances which existed at the
time of its actions.
NPCA speculates regarding the County's possible approval of
federal acquisition if its interest in section 16.

NPCA has no

idea what the County might do. In fact, the County intends to make
the best decision it can, based upon all relevant facts and law,
when

the

information

becomes

perspective, no outcome

available.

is foreclosed,

From
including

the

County's

approval of

federal acquisition of its interest in section 16, except those
which

are

precluded

by

law,

policy

or

rational

factual

considerations.
One might speculate that the appraisal to be obtained by the
Division for section 16 could be higher than the appraisals of
other sections involved in the federal-state exchange.

In that

case, assuming arguendo that the Division has the choice of which
exchange to pursue, the Division's duty would clearly be to follow
through with the exchange with the County.
There are a multitude of considerations which might apply in
comparing the value to the trust of an exchange of section 16 with
Garfield County to inclusion of the section in the federal-state
exchange. These considerations include, for example, the question
of whether the trust will gain more, over time, from ownership of
the section by the County than from ownership by the federal
government, in addition to considering the initial value obtained
7

in either exchange.

NPCA is clearly speculating when it supposes

possible uses of section 16 by Garfield County in support of its
arguments that the section must be included in the federal-state
exchange in order to protect the "noneconomic" values which are the
real focus of its concerns.

All of these considerations are

speculative, at best, compelling a decision not to rehear this
matter on the basis of such marginal considerations.

As noted

below, this Court has properly chosen not to second-guess the
Division's treatment of those considerations.
Fundamentally, however, the considerations applicable to the
federal-state land exchange just signed into law are not relevant
to this case.
B.

FEDERAL ACTIONS TAKEN IN 1993 ARE IRRELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES OF THIS CASE.

The federal legislation authorizing an exchange with the state
of Utah has been enacted and signed by the president.

Therefore,

no urgency is posed for consideration by this Court now of issues
which might affect that legislation.

Furthermore, the federal

legislation is not relevant to the state law issues raised by NPCA
and by

the state and

this Court should

avoid

incorporating

questions of federal law into this case.
1.

The federal-state land exchange is not
relevant to this matter.

The arguments concerning the importance of the federal-state
land exchange do not have sufficient relevance to this case to
justify rehearing.

As noted above, NPCA posits a series of

speculative notions to argue the potential
8

relevance

of the

federal-state exchange to the trusteefs duties in this case.
However, timing alone is sufficient to render these arguments
irrelevant.

An exchange which was legislated in 1993, six years

after the exchange of section 16 in 1987, is not relevant to the
trusteefs duties in 1987. In fact, it is clear from the delay and
the vagaries of the procedure leading up to the federal-state
exchange, that rejection of Garfield County's bona fide offer in
1987 on the basis of the possibility of some form of federal-state
exchange would have not have been in the best interests of the
trust.

As the legislation makes clear, the state does not know

today, and may not know for many years, what the value of that
exchange might be.
This Court has already addressed the federal-state exchange,
insofar as it is relevant to this case, when it recognized that the
Division properly addressed the then-existing facts concerning the
potential federal-state exchange.

215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29.

The remaining issue in this case now focuses on whether the
value obtained for section 16 was adequate in 1987.

The possible

outcome of the federal-state exchange is clearly not relevant to
that question.
2.

This court does not have jurisdiction to
decide the application of the recent
federal legislation to section 16 and
should not allow injection of such an
issue into this case.

The jurisdictional focus of this Court is on the procedures
followed by the Division as a matter of state law.

The Court's

decision must be made based upon the law applicable to the state as
9

trustee.

It is apparent that the issue of the asserted potential

for inclusion of this section in the federal-state land exchange,
insofar as it involves an interpretation of Congress1 intent, is a
matter of federal law, not cognizable by this Court and not
properly raised in this matter.
It is also apparent from the arguments raised by NPCA that if
this Court were to choose to engage in consideration of the issues
raised concerning the federal-state land exchange, a substantial
body

of

federal

legislative history

and the

factual

history

pertinent to negotiations between the state and other parties to
effect the federal legislation would have to be addressed.

This

Court should not grant rehearing to consider such a complex matter,
given its substantive irrelevance to the current status of the
transaction between Garfield County and the state.
C.

THE LAW OF TRUSTS. AS WELL AS THE EXISTING
OPINION OF THIS COURT. MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE
DEED IS NOT VOID.

This Court relied on the general law of trusts in determining
the duties of the state in administering school trust lands.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.

215

Based upon that law, the Court determined

that the Division had a duty to obtain an independent appraisal.
Id. at 29.
The breach of that duty, alone, is not sufficient to void the
action of the trustee, under the case law cited by this Court, as
outlined in Section II.A.1, above.

A conveyance made within the

valid power of a trustee is valid if the discretion of the trustee
is honestly and faithfully exercised.
10

"When honestly and fairly

made, the sale and conveyance will not be invalidated by conduct
not amounting to fraud or by minor defects in the proceedings, by
negligible falsehoods not affecting the results or by subsequent
acts and events."

90 C.J.S. Trusts § 297 (1955).

There is no evidence that any of the factors which might
support invalidation of the deeds of exchange apply in this case.
To the contrary, the evidence is clear that the breach of duty was
based upon a good-faith understanding by the Division of its duties
as trustee and that the actions carried out were all conducted in
good faith.
Under the general law of trusts, if, in fact, the trustee
failed to obtain the greatest possible monetary return for the
lands, then the trustee may be liable in damages to the trust.2
The cases relied upon by this Court all provided for damages
awards.

None voided deeds executed in the absence of fraud.

This Court, likewise, acknowledged, by its framing of its
decision, that the issue here is not the voidness or voidability of
the deed, but rather, the amount of money which should have been
obtained:
We remand this case to the Division for a
determination of whether the appraised values
of section 16 and the Garfield County lands
offered in exchange represent the full value
of those lands.
2

That legal principle, alone, argues persuasively that this
Court should not rehear this matter, but, rather, should wait to
find out what the new appraisal reveals and what actions the
parties might take when that information becomes available. If,
for example, Garfield County were to indemnify the trustee for any
damages which might be attributable to a breach of duty, the issue
of damages would be moot.
11

The stay presently in effect will
continue until the Division makes the
requisite determinations that the value of the
land exchanged for section 16 is adequate
under its trust obligations.
215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29.
Clearly, this Court contemplated the possibility that the
existing exchange did provide adequate value, thus necessitating no
further action by the trustee or the County to validate the
exchange.
Since the County obtained specific property in Richfield at
the request of the Division which, along with the airport property
in Garfield County, has been deeded to the state, it is not just
the patent to the County which is under consideration heref but
also the deeds from the County to the state.

The issues which

might be raised in considering voidability of such a transaction
should be addressed only if necessary after obtaining the necessary
facts which should be provided by the new appraisals.
Garfield County included a substantial body of case law in its
brief on appeal which establishes that the patent in this case
cannot be invalidated on the facts presented.

See, Brief of

Intervenor, Garfield County, at pp. 16-18, attached hereto as
Exhibit C.
Furthermore, under the holdings of this Court, NPCA does not
have standing to contest the validity of the deed itself.

This

Court held that NPCA has a "limited right of intervention" on the
issue of whether the state had a duty to obtain independent
appraisals.

215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29, n. 11. That issue has been
12

decided.

NPCA's

standing

"paralyze"

government

does not extend

programs

disposition of property.

dealing

with

to the right to
acquisition

and

Id. at 23.

Given the substantial body of common law applicable to trusts
which establishes the continued validity of the deed to Garfield
County and given the clear intent of this Court, no rehearing
should be granted to determine the validity of the deeds.
D.

THE ISSUE OF THE STATE'S DUTY WITH REGARD TO
SCHOOL TRUST LANDS IN RELATION TO "NQNECONQMIC"
VALUES HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY
ADDRESSED IN THE COURT'S EXISTING OPINION AND
SHOULD NOT BE REVISITED.

This Court has already amply addressed the issues raised by
NPCA in section II of its petition for rehearing, carefully
considering the state's duties as trustee in relation to "noneconomic" considerations.
the

considerations

posed

It is clear that this Court understood
by

NPCA

in

the

appeal.

NPCA's

dissatisfaction with the result of this decision cannot form a
valid basis for reconsideration. This Court properly ruled that it
cannot impose an affirmative duty on the state to look for "noneconomic" options as a priority in conducting an exchange such as
the one under consideration here.
III.

CONCLUSION

This Court has ruled that the state had the obligation to get
the greatest possible monetary return for the school section in the
exchange with the County. Until the new appraisals tell us whether
that obligation was, in fact, fulfilled, no further delay of the
appraisal process should take place to reconsider the issues raised
13

by NPCA and the state.

There are substantial legal bases to

establish that the patent to Garfield County, as well as the deeds
from the County to the state, are not void or voidable.

In the

event this Court does grant rehearing, Garfield County requests an
adequate opportunity prior to rehearing to further research and
brief the issues relevant to voidness or voidability of deeds under
the applicable law. t^fl^
DATED THIS

+/ /

day of Octq**£r, 1993.
/
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Tab A

WALLACE A. LEE #5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: (801) 676-2290
BARBARA G. HJELLE #4597
Special Counsel to Garfield County
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
(800) 628-7777
Attorneys for Defendant
GARFIELD COUNTY
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL PARKS AND
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS V.
HATCH

vs.
BOARD OF STATE LANDS and
PATRICK D. SPURGIN, AS
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondents, and

Case No. 880022

GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH
Intervenor.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF GARFIELD

)
: ss.
)

THOMAS V. HATCH, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Chairman of the Garfield County Commission.

In

that capacity, I conducted the negotiations for the exchange by
the County of the section of land within Capitol Reef National
Park ("Switchbacks Section") which is the subject of this action.
I am competent to testify regarding the matters set forth below
based upon personal knowledge.

Although this affidavit has been

prepared by counsel for Garfield County, I have carefully
reviewed and edited the affidavit and its contents correctly
represent the testimony I would give if called as a witness.
2.

As we entered into negotiations to exchange the

Switchbacks Section, I was informed by the Land Specialist
administering that area for the Division of State Lands and
Forestry that the County would be required to hire an appraiser
to establish market value for the parcels of property being
considered for exchange.

Since I did not know any appraiser in

Garfield County, I asked the Division to provide me with the
names of qualified appraisers to perform this service.
3.

Garfield County then hired Barry Judd, of Kanab, Utah,

as the appraiser based upon the recommendation of the Division.
At no time did I or any other Garfield County employee discuss
the appraisal process with Mr. Judd, other than to provide him
with information which he requested from us in the course of the
appraisal process.
4.

No official or employee of Garfield County was or is in

any way associated with or related to Mr. Judd.

5.

To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the

appraisal was conducted in a professional manner, without
influence or pressure being applied by or bias in favor of or
against either party to the transaction.
6.

During the course of

negotiations, and after the

appraisal of the first parcels of property suggested for
exchange, the Division informed the County that additional land
would be required to ensure that the state received more than
100% of the market value of the lands being exchanged.
7.

The Division selected the parcel it wanted to add to the

exchange, specifying a parcel in the industrial park in
Richfield, Utah, as land it desired to obtain.

The County

entered into an agreement with the owner of that parcel to
exchange it specifically for the exchange with the state.

The

transaction for that exchange was handled as part of the escrow
arrangements for the entire exchange;
together.

all transactions occurred

The appraisal process was consistent throughout.

DATED THIS

gT^

day of October, 1993.

THOMAS V. HATCH, AFFIANT

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF GARFIELD )

ss.

On this the C> - day of October, 1993, personally appeared
before me, THOMAS V. HATCH, the affiant in the foregoing
document, who after being first dulysworn, did acknowledge to me
that he did sign the same* ,.
V
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Utah Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993r?.
SECTION 2. UTAH-NAVAJO LAND EXCHANGE.
(a) ADDITIONS TO RESERVATION.—For the purpose of securing in trust for the
Navajo Nation certain lands belonging to the State of Utah, which comprise
approximately thirty-eight thousand five hundred acres of surface and subsurface
estate, and approximately an additional nine thousand five hundred acres of subsurface estate, as generally depicted on the map entitled "Utah-Navajo Land
Exchange", dated May 18, 1992, such lands are hereby declared to be part of the
Navajo Indian Reservation in the State of Utah effective upon the completion of
conveyance from the State of Utah and acceptance of title by the United States.
(b) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire
through exchange those lands and interests in lands described in subsection (a) which
are owned by the State of Utah, subject to valid existing rights.
SEC. 3. STATE LANDS WITHIN THE GOSHUTE INDIAN RESERVATION.
(a) ADDITION TO RESERVATION.~--For the purpose of securing in trust for the
Goshute Indian Tribe certain lands belonging to the State of Utah, which comprise
approximately nine hundred eighty acres of surface and subsurface estate, and an
additional four hundred eighty acres of subsurface estate, as generally depicted on
the map entitled "Utah-Goshute Land Exchange", dated May 18,1992, such lands are
hereby declared to be part of the Goshute Indian Reservation in the State of Utah
effective upon the completion of conveyance from the State of Utah and acceptance
of title by the United States(b) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire
through exchange those lands and interests in lands described in subsection (a) which
are owned by the State of Utah, subject to valid existing rights.
(c) OTHER LAND.--(l) The following tract of Federal land located in the State of
Nevada, comprising approximately 5 acres more or less, together with all
improvements thereon is hereby declared to be part of the Goshute Indian
Reservation, and shall be held in trust for the Goshute Indian Tribe: Township 30
North, Range 69 East, Lots 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 14 of Section 34.
(2) No part of the lands referred to in paragraph (1) shall be used for gaming or any
related purpose.
SEC.4. IMPLEMENTATION.
The exchanges authorized by sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall be conducted without
cost to the Navajo Nation and the Goshute Indian Tribe.

S. 184
Page 2
SEC.5. STATE LANDS WITHIN THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM.
(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to accept on
behalf of the United States title to the school and institutional trust lands owned by
the State of Utah within units of the National Forest System, comprising
approximately seventy-six thousand acres as depicted on a map entitled "Utah Forest
Land Exchange", dated May 18, 1992.
(b) STATUS.—Any lands acquired by the United States pursuant to this section shall
become a part of the national forest within which such lands are located and shall be
subject to all the laws and regulations applicable to the National Forest System.
SEC.6. STATE LANDS WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM.
(a) AUTHORIZATION,—The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to accept
on behalf of the United States title to all school and institutional trust lands owned
by the State of Utah located within all units of the National Park System, comprising
approximately eighty thousand acres, located within the State of Utah on the date
of enactment of this Act.
(b) STATUS.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all lands of the State
of Utah within units of the National Park System that are conveyed to the United
States pursuant to this section shall become a part of the appropriate unit of the
National Park System, and shall be subject to all laws and regulations applicable to
that unit of the National Park System,
(2) The Secretary of the Interior shall, as a part of the exchange process of this Act,
compensate the State of Utah for the fair market value of 580.64 acres within Capitol
Reef National Park that were conveyed by the State of Utah to the United States on
July 2,1971, for which the State has never been compensated. The fair market value
of these lands shall be established pursuant to section 8 of this Act.
SEC.7. OFFER TO STATE.
(a) SPECIFIC OFFBKS.—Within 30 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of the Interior shall transmit to the State of Utah a list of lands, or interests in lands,
within the State of Utah for transfer to the State of Utah in exchange for the State
lands and interests described in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6 of this Act. Such list shall
include only the following Federal lands, or interests therein:
(1) Blue Mountain Telecommunications Site, fee estate, approximately 640 acres,
(2) Beaver Mountain Ski Resort Site, fee estate, approximately 3,000 acres, as
generally depicted on the map entitled "Beaver Mountain Ski Resort" dated
September 16, 1992.
(3) The unleased coal located in the Winter Quarters tract.
(4) The unleased coal located in the Crandall Canyon tract*
(5) All royalties receivable by the United States with respect to coal leases in the
Quitchupah (Convulsion Canyon) tract.
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(6) The unleased coal located in the Cottonwood Canyon tract.
(7) The unleased coal located in the Soldier Creek tract.
(b) ADDITIONAL OFFERS.--(l) In addition to the lands and interests specified in
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Interior shall offer to the State of Utah a portion
of the royalties receivable by the United States with respect to Federal geothermal,
oil, gas, or other mineral interests in Utah which on December 31,1992 were under
lease and covered by an approved permit to drill or plan of development and plan of
reclamation, were in production, and were not under administrative or judicial
appeal.
(2) No offer under this subsection shall be for royalties aggregating more than 50 per
centum of the total appraised value of the state lands described in sections 2, 3, 5,
and 6.
(3) The Secretary shall make no offer under this subsection which would enable the
State of Utah to receive royalties under this section exceeding $50,000,000,
(4) If the total value of lands and interests therein and royalties offered to the State
pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) is less than the total value of the State lands
described in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6, the Secretary shall provide the State a list of all
public lands in Utah that as of December 31, 1992, the Secretary in Resource
Management Plans prepared, pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, had identified as suitable for disposal by exchange or otherwise, and
shall offer to transfer to the State any or all of such lands, as selected by the State,
in partial exchange for such State lands, to the extent consistent with other
applicable laws and regulations.
SEC. 8. APPRAISAL OF LANDS TO BE EXCHANGED.
(a) EQUAL VALUE,-All exchanges authorized under this Act shall be for equal
value. No later than 90 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the
Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Governor of the State of Utah shall
provide for an appraisal of the lands or interests therein involved in the exchanges
authorized by this Act. A detailed appraisal report shall utilize nationally recognized
appraisal standards including, to the extent appropriate, the Uniform Appraisal
Standards for Federal Land Acquisition.
Cb) DEADLINE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION.-^) If after two years from the date
of enactment of this Act, the parties have not agreed upon the final terms of some or
all of the exchanges authorized by this Act, including the value of the lands involved
in some or all of such exchanges, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, aidj
apprc^rm^Umt^
the United
States District COUIT for the District of Utah, Central Division, shall have jurisdiction
to hear, determine, and render judgment on the value of any and all lands, or
interests therein, involved in the exchange.
^2) No action provided for in this subsection may be filed with the court no sooner
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than 2 years and later than 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act. Any
decision of a District Court under this Act may be appealed in accordance with
applicable laws and rules.
(c) ADJUSTMENT-If the State shares revenue from the selected federal properties
the value of such properties shall be the value otherwise established under this
section, less the percentage which represents the federal revenue sharing obligation,
but such adjustment shall not be considered as reflecting a property right of the State
of Utah.
(d) INTEREST-Any royalty offer by the Secretary pursuant to Subsection 7 (b) shall
be adjusted to reflect net present value as of the effective date of the exchange. The
State shall be entitled to receive a reasonable rate of interest at a rate equivalent to
a five year treasury note on the balance of the value owed by the United States from
the effective date of the exchange until full value is received by the State and mineral
rights revert to the United States as prescribed by Subsection 9 (a) (3),
SEC. 9. TRANSFER OF TITLE.
(a) TERMS.--(l) The State of Utah shall be entitled to receive so much of those lands
or interests in lands and additional royalties described in section 7 that are offered
by the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by the State as are equal in value to the
State lands and interests described in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6.
(2) For those properties where fee simple title is to be conveyed to the State of Utah,
the Secretary of the Interior shall convey, subject to valid existing rights, all right,
title and interest, subject to the provisions of subsection (b). For those properties
where less than fee simple is to be conveyed to the State of Utah, the Secretary shall
reserve to the United States all remaining right, title and interest of the United
States.
(3) All right, title, and interest in any mineral rights described in section 7 that are
conveyed to the State of Utah pursuant to this Act shall revert to the United States
upon removal of minerals equal in value to the value attributed to such rights in
connection with an exchange under this Act.
(4) If the State of Utah accepts the offers provided for in this Act, the State shall
convey to the United States, subrject to valid existing rights, all right, title and
interest of the State to all school and institutional trust lands described in sections
2, 3, 5, and 6 of this Act* Except as provided in section 7(b), conveyance of all lands
or interests in lands shall take place within 60 days following agreement by the
Secretary of the Interior and the Governor of the State of Utah, or entry of an
appropriate order of judgment by the district court.
(b) INSPECTIONS.-Both parties shall inspect all pertinent records and shall conduct
a physical inspection of the lands to be exchanged pursuant to this Act for the
presence of any hazardous materials as presently defined by applicable law. The
results of those inspections shall be made available to the parties. Responsibility for
costs of remedial action related to materials identified by such inspections shall be
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borne by those entities responsible under existing law*
(c) CONDITIONS.--(l) With respect to the lands and interests described in section 7,
enactment of this Act shall be construed as satisfying the provisions of section 206(a)
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 requiring that exchanges of
lands be in the public interest.
(2) Development of any mineral interest transferred to the State of Utah pursuant
to this Act shall be subject to all laws, rules, and regulations applicable to
development of non-Federal mineral interests, including, where appropriate, laws,
rules, and regulations applicable to such development within National Forests.

^a|;nip^

M®^
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SEC. 10. LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL—As soon as practicable after the date of enactment, a map and
legal description of the lands added to the Navajo and Goshute Indian Reservations
and all lands exchanged under this Act shall be filed by the appropriate Secretary
with the Committee on Natural Resources of the United States House of
Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the United
States Senate, and each such map and description shall have the same force and
effect as if included in this Act, except that the appropriate Secretary may. correct
clerical and typographical errors in each such legal description and map. Each such
map and legal description shall be on file and available for public inspection in the
offices of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior and the Utah
offices of the appropriate agencies of the Department of the Interior and Department
of Agriculture.
(b) PILT.-Section 6902(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking
"acquisition/1 and inserting in lieu thereof "acquisition, nor does this subsection apply
to payments for lands in Utah acquired by the United States if at the time of such
acquisition units, under applicable State law, were entitled to receive payments from
the State for such lands, but in such case no payment under this chapter with respect
to such acquired lands shall exceed the payment that would have been made under
State law if such lands had not been acquired".
(c) INTENT.-The lands and interests described m section 7 are an offer related only
to the State lands and interests described in this Act, and nothing in this Act shall
be construed as precluding conveyance of other lands or interests to the State of Utah
pursuant to other exchanges under applicable existing law or subsequent Act of
Congress. It is the intent of Congress that the State should establish a funding
mechanism, or some other mechanism, to assure that counties within the State are
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treated equitably as a result of this exchange.
(d) COSTS.-The United States and the State of Utah shall each bear its own
respective costs incurred in the implementation of this Act.
(e) DEFINITION.--As used in this Act, the term "school and institutional trust lands"
means those properties granted by the United States in the Utah Enabling Act to the
State of Utah in trust and other lands which under State law must be managed for
the benefit of the public school system or the institutions of the State which are
designated by the Utah Enabling Act.
SEC.ll. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this
Act.
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POINT IV: THE VALIDITY OF THE PATENT TO GARFIELD COUNTY SHOULD BE
UPHELD,

As evidenced by the Patent issued by the State of Utah to
Garfield County, a copy of which is included in the Addendum to
this Brief, Garfield County is now the owner, in fee simple
absolute, of the real property which is the subject of this
action.

Petitioner seeks to have that conveyance rescinded by

this Court in its "Petition for Review".
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared in Easterlinq
v. Ferris, 651 P. 2d 677 (Okla. 1982) at 682, "The cancellation
of a deed is an exertion of the most extraordinary power of a
court of equity.

The power ought not to be exercised except in a

clear and exceptional case."

Furthermore, this Court has held

that, in order to obtain a decree rescinding a written
:onveyance, the facts necessary for the allowance of that* .remedy
aust be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by a
lere preponderance.

Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 5 71

1950) at 580.
More than a century ago, this Court was asked to decide
hether a land patent was improperly granted.

In Ferry v.

treet, 4 Utah 521, 7 P. 712 (1885), this Court specifically
eld, "If, under any assumed state of circumstances a patent can
£ valid, then it cannot be attacked in any collateral
roceeding, or in any manner, except by direct action to set
side the deed indicated, either by the United States, or by the
arsons who have succeeded to its right."
imphasis added.)
16

7 P. at 713.

On re-hearing, this Court carefully considered the
validity of the patent in Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 P. 571
(1886), and held as follows:
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
establish the following propositions of law: First.
That the various acts of Congress mentioned reserving
portions of the public lands of the United States to
the territories or states for the benefit of their
people, vest the title of such lands so reserved in the
territories or states when the lands are surveyed, or
when they are bounded and ascertained. Until such time
the obligation is executory, and the title remains in
the federal government. Second. .If the officers of
the land department had no authority to issue the
patent, for the reason that there was no law
authorizing the sale of the land, or that it had been
reserved for sale, (being identified,) or that the
title was not in the United States, the patent is void.
Third. As to all questions of fact which the land
department is called upon to consider and pass upon
before issuing the patent, the judgment of that department is unassailable, except in a direct proceeding for
its annulment. Fourth. Among the questions the land
department is called upon to consider is the character
of the land, and the class to which it belongs, whether
agricultural or mineral, and whether it is within a
town-site. Fifth. ][f the land department had jurisdiction, the law conclusively presumes, in a collateral
proceeding, the existence OJ£ all circumstances essential to the validity of the patent"! Unless the patent
is void, in view of the law, or of circumstances which
the court may take judicial notice of, it must be held
valid. All other essential circumstances must be
presumed to have existed. 11 P. at 576. (Emphasis
added.)
The appeal of that case was dismissed by the United
^ates Supreme Court in Street v. Ferry,

119 U.S. 385 (1886).

This principle was applied to a patent of state lands
l Perry v..McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953), in
lich this Court held that "an attack on the patent, valid on its
Lee, ... is reserved unto the sovereign." 264 P. 2d at 854.
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{Emphasis added. )

Therefore, under Utah law, NPCA has no legal

basis for a collateral attack upon the Patent in this case.
The general rule that a patent to land is the highest
evidence of title, and is immune from collateral attack, prevails
throughout the Western states.
Ariz. App. 551, 441 P. 2d 586

See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 7(Ariz. App. 1968);

Hill, 150 Colo. 563, 375 P. 2d 337 (Colo. 1962);

Ashley v.
Dredge Corp. v.

Husite Co. , 78 Nev. 69, 369 P. 2d 676 (Nev. 1962); cert, denied,
371 U.S. 821 (1962);
1285 (N.M. 1978);

Bustamante v. Sena, 92 N.M. 72, 582 P. 2d

See generally, 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Lands,

Sections 74-76 (1984), pp. 572-574.
In addition to the fact that, under a century of
precedent by this Court, NPCA has no legal basis for a collateral
attack upon the validity of the Patent in this case, there are
compelling policy reasons why the validity of the Patent should
De upheld in this case.

The State of Utah, as the holder of

leeds to the real property which was conveyed to the State by
Garfield County last year, has undoubtedly received the benefits
Df and profits from the use of those lands, and may well have
ilready included those lands in management plans and contractual

irrangemants
exchange.

with third peurtles,

in rellancQ

upon the

subject

There is no clear and convincing evidence before this

lourt which would warrant the rescission of those conveyances,
Jid the violation of any contractual arrangements which may have
een made in reliance thereon. The "Petition for Review" should
e dismissed, with prejudice.
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